Three possible questions on the mind point to three different levels
Diagnosis: in the debate on the mental, functionalism tends to confuse the questions (2) and (3) to question (1), given its persistence in defining how the mental essential to what constitutes the organizational structure or functional the mind.
Why Functionalism confuses different levels?: Outline of an explanation
1. Behind the confusion of levels incurred functionalism confusion there are a number of contributors or, at least, some implicit assumptions that should be reviewed. Some such confusion or significant assumptions, among others:
The “heritage” that functionalism has with the computer science and its “early debt” with artificial intelligence
In the artificial world is not only inappropriate but it is necessary to standardize the essence of a being to its function, since it has been specifically designed to carry (in Aristotelian terms, its essence can be likened to their final cause is tell your “why”) Coming from the functional analogy between minds and computers, functionalism is necessarily “doomed” to understand the mental in terms of functions, even when the cost associated with the company resulting in a distortion of the object study. Also, support much of his research program in the development of “artificial systems thinking”, functionalism ends subordinate to the eventual success to occur, would again define the mental in terms of functions.
However, one should not forget that the mind is a natural entity, where the basic nature and function are inseparable amalgam.
2. The confusion of mind, in its strict sense, and intelligence
Functionalism, with its constant recurrence to what a system is able to do (ie., its function) as defining the mental (at the expense of substance that the system is made), implicitly seems to refer more to the intelligence ( vg. “intelictiva mind”) that the mind in general (ie., the “psyche”) Perhaps this is one of the reasons that could explain satisfactorily functionalism those mental phenomena that involve processes that act as causal powers of any mental product (such as intelligence and creativity), while that issue is really the explanation of those phenomena that are intrinsic mental states (ie, they are what they are regardless of their causes or effects other states) as the feelings and emotions in general.
3. Skepticism about the existence of other minds and their basic implication: the need for an ontological proof
Whoever begins maintaining a strong skepticism about the existence of other minds almost certainly lead to the need for mental ontological proof of their very different way of allocating basic principle. And according to the context of the problem, the basic feature of this test is determined according to the following hypothetical-deductive rule:
IF A PROPERTY IS ATTRIBUTED INTERNAL “X” to a body “O”, and “X” is not directly observable, external manifestations THEN Look for “C” from “or” consistent with the existence of “X”. If they are found, then redefine “X” in these terms: “X” IS THAT AN AGENCY TO “O” ALLOWS YOU TO DO “C”
Described, known as “functional tautology” can also be categorized (following Searle) as a “residual behaviorism,” and as a final possible explanation for the confusion between the role of the mental and the basic nature incurred by functionalism.
4. The fallacy of the unconscious aconciente
Another typical error of functionalism can be conceptualized in terms of the fallacy of the “unconscious aconciente.” The distinction between the two terms is the difference between what might be called the unconscious psychological and the “unconscious” is not relevant where the attribution of consciousness. To say that someone was motivated by unconscious thinking clearly means something different than adcribiríamos, for example, the idea that a thermostat is an unconscious system or a refrigerator is governed by an unconscious mechanism. It is clear that in the first event we refer to a mental character (even when it is an open question which corresponds give precise meaning), while the latter is a metaphorical way of referring to a physical system or one of its mechanism. For this reason some authors have preferred the term to distinguish between unconscious, applicable to certain types of psiológico phenomenon, and the term “aconciente” reserved to indicate that an object or system does not have consciousness or mental nature.
Now, to my mind the functionalism seems to confuse the two meanings when you hold the following argument: “Since there is a series of mental phenomena are not aware, but whose existence is necessary to postulate (whether theoretical need and / or empirical evidence) to causal determinants and how to make intelligible certain aspects of conscious experience, it follows that the level of consciousness is not relevant, since what matters is the level of the unconscious. ” Once rid of the need to conceptualize consciousness as a necessary attribute of mind, functionalism seems to feel free to go a step further to now argue that “since consciousness is not relevant as defining mental, mental systems could have even when there was no conscience. ” Idea that allows you to conclude that “if you were truly relevant relational-functional logic-information system (read the computations that operate on representations informational), then any system that will implement a mental system, beyond the substance of which is composed ”
4. The fallacy of the unconscious aconciente
At the core of those arguments, functionalism does not seem to notice that among the postulation of an unconscious system of mental representations “inside” of a conscious mind and the computer software, there may be a world of difference. It then concluded that the approval of both orders and not supported by relational analogy “the mind is to brain as software is to hardware”, but in the uncritical application of a double thesis that after denying relevance to the conscious mind says that the unconscious mind must be essentially computational.
In short: What is the contribution of informational and functionalist theories for the explanation and understanding of the mental?
The above remarks about the structural problems of functionalism in both generic theory on mental, are independent of consideration of their successes to explain and understand how the mind is organized and how it works.
In these respects I think the Green Card Lottery informational-functional metaphor that supports the functionality is an effective heuristic for understanding basic questions such as:
The architecture of the mind, ie the structural organization of the mind in terms of sub-components and their relationships.
The workings of the mind, ie the mode and the logic that “mental machinery” can capture information from the world, translating it into mental states, and how certain mental states are transformed into other following certain types of processes and regulations in order to allow the body to behave adaptively in the world.
I believe that the principles, language and methodological strategies specific to the theories of information and computing are certainly crucial to the successful approach of those levels. However, disbelieve as necessary, or even desirable, to pay for that use the price of distorting what essentially appears to be mental.
In short, functionalism is a useful strategy to respond to questions about the organization and functioning of the mental, yet forceful in their attempts to define its basic nature.
Some Preliminary Ideas
In the context of the mental approach, the idea of reductionism implies from a sort of dualism appariential. Indeed, for the operation of reducing the mental to a different nature have meaning, it is necessary that, first of all, there is a difference between what has to be reduced and that to which it will be reduced.
In this regard, sometimes the term ‘reductionism’ carries a negative charge, as it seems to connote a kind of degradation or denaturation of the intrinsically mental. However, it should be noted that if any of the so-called reductionist thesis were true, rather than reductionism should be characterized as simple and authentic realism.
In contrast, the idea of reductionism sometimes usually appears as a worthy end in itself, as it seems to respond to a scientific ideal virtual focus to account for the vast diversity of the real through a small set of principles explanatory (unified field theory, theory of everything, etc.).
The Problem of Reductionism
Relating ontological and epistemological levels refer to the monistic and dualistic, comes the next space of possibilities:
1. Reductionism realistic: There is only one kind of objects or properties and our theoretical concepts are consistent with this reality. In this sense, the term ‘reductionism’ be somewhat misleading, since it would be more of a process of demystification of appearances resulting from an unveiling of reality.
2. Reductionism wrong: The reality is dualistic, to the extent that in addition to physical objects or properties exist, there are mental objects or properties. Assume that there is one sort of thing would then incur a genuine reduction.
3. Dualism wrong: There is only one kind of object or property. To the extent that we assume that there is a second kind of things or properties would make the mistake of attributing “ghost in the machine (Ryle), in the” myth of the Cartesian theater “(Ryle, Dennett) or in violation of parsimony of scientific explanations, to multiply entities unnecessarily (Occam).
4. Realistic Dualism: The reality is dualistic, to the extent that in addition to physical objects or properties exist, there are mental objects or properties. Apply dualism would only be the result of adapting our cognitive categories to reality.
If reality were dual (or plural) constitute a genuine Reductionism ERROR, THE POSITION BE A REDUCED SPURIOUS fallacious one reality to another
If reality were Monist, THEN AN ERROR reductions It would be a SUCCESS, TO THE EXTENT THAT WOULD BE THE RESULT OF ADAPTING OUR SYSTEM LOGIC OF CATEGORY A REALITY. CONSTITURIA UNVEILS A POSITION TO KNOW WHAT IS THE ESSENCE THAT HIDES BEHIND A LOOK
The Problem of Reductionism
Different rates of reduction and classic example (according to Searle, 1994)
Example:
The red color corresponding to the sense of “rojedad” of our subjective experience, actually corresponds to a load of wavelength of 625 nm. Therefore, according to the reductionist thesis, the red color is only photon emission of 625 nm., Why can thus be defined scientifically, without residue of meaning.
There is logic involved in the reduction process, which can be described as follows:
1. Initially, the phenomenon will be reduced then it is simply an object or real aspect.
2. Before the attempt to try to uncover its essence and / or determine their underlying causes, the object is still considered real, lie their underlying causes are hardly any just a working hypothesis.
3. Finally, given the success in the discovery of their causal powers, they go to constitute the reality of the phenomenon, while its former nature becomes a mere semblance considered epiphenomenon.
